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Abstract
Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism
is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even
though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argu-
ment in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing
strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox seman-
tics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert
Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative
to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example
of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for
which it fails.
1 Introduction
Several theists such as Zagzebski (1990), Freddoso (1986), and Morris (1987),
have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about coun-
terpossibles. Others, such as Pearce and Pruss (2012), have even relied on
nonvacuism to develop certain accounts of important theistic doctrines, such
as divine omnipotence. Accordingly, a counterpossible is a subjunctive condi-
tional, or counterfactual, of the form “if it were the case that p, it would be
the case that q”, with an impossible antecedent. Examples of counterpossibles
include
(1) If 2 + 2 were 5, dogs would be better than cats,
(2) If Phosphorus were not Hesperus, Frege’s preferred examples would be
misleading,
(3) If Phosphorus were not Phosphorus, something would not be self-identical.
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Moreover, there are different senses in which the antecedent of a counterpos-
sible might be said to be impossible. In the cases above, for instance, the
antecedent in (2) is usually claimed to be metaphysically impossible. This
is because “Phosphorus is Hesperus” is taken to be metaphysically necessary
according to the widely held view of the necessity of identity, defended in
Kripke (1980). By contrast, the antecedent in (3) is not just metaphysically
impossible, but logically impossible as well, since the logical relation of iden-
tity is reflexive. Thus, (3) is sometimes referred to as a counterlogical. Under
a certain approach to arithmetical truths the antecedent of (1) is also logically
impossible; but it can also be labeled, if only to be less controversial, as arith-
metically or mathematically impossible. Other cases could involve physical
and deontic impossibility, to name a few. But the modality for counterpossi-
bles that is relevant to our discussion is assumed to be objective, like the ones
mentioned above, in contrast with epistemic, or subjective modality.
Now, vacuism about counterpossibles is the thesis that all counterpossi-
bles are vacuously true. Nonvacuism, in turn, is just the negation of vacuism.
Vacuism has gained much support from the orthodox semantics for counter-
factuals in terms of similarity or closeness between possible worlds offered by
Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973), and Kratzer (1979), according to which all
counterpossibles are vacuously true. Roughly, the orthodox semantics says
that a counterfactual is true if and only if (i) the antecedent is impossible, or
(ii) at the possible worlds closest to the actual world where the antecedent is
true the consequent is true as well.1 Consequently, it can be readily seen that
(1)–(3) are all vacuously true given condition (i). More recently, Williamson
(2007, 2017) has also taken up the cause of vacuism, with a battery of argu-
ments in its favour. Thus, it is fair to render nonvacuism as heterodox.
But why think that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism? Philo-
sophical lore has it that any property possessed by God is possessed essentially,
or necessarily.2 Accordingly, God is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, om-
nipresent, omnibenevolent, etc. Also, if God exists at all, it is by necessity; or,
by contraposition, if it possible at all for God to exist, then God exists.3 The
1There are fine distinctions here between Lewis and Stalnaker. The latter (but not the
former) accepts the Limit Assumption, that is, the thesis that there is always a smallest set of
worlds most similar to the antecedent world. Whether one accepts the Limit Assumption has
important consequences on the exact formulation of truth conditions for counterfactuals (see,
for instance, Brogaard and Salerno (2013, pp. 640-1)). However, we are mostly concerned
here about counterpossibles, and will pass over some of the details about counterfactuals in
general.
2This is, of course, the concept of God traditionally assumed by western philosophers
and, in particular, analytic philosophy of religion.
3I am using “essential” as synonym for “necessary” here, which is controversial since at
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theist then seems committed to the claim that the following propositions are
all (metaphysically or conceptually) impossible:
(4) God does not exist,
(5) God is evil,
(6) God is not omnipresent, etc.
This, in turn, means that the following propositions are counterpossibles:
(7) If God did not exist, matter would not exist.
(8) If God did not exist, matter would still exist.
Nevertheless, some theists, especially the trio mentioned above, think that
while sentences like (7) seem true and unproblematic, (8) appears to be false.
For, per impossible, had God not existed, no-one would have created matter.
Therefore, if theism is true, at least some counterpossibles are false.
Of course, the only support just offered for nonvacuism is the intuition
that (8) is false. Yet, Zagzebski (1990) offers an actual argument in support
of vacuism if only to reject it afterwards on behalf of nonvacuism. Wierenga
(1999) claims, however, that Zagzebski’s rejection of vacuism is solely based on
her intuition that counterpossibles such as (8) are false, and he in turn provides
reasons supporting an important premise in Zagzebski’s argument for vacuism
that he takes to be independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals.
This is important since, had the argument turned out to depend upon the
orthodox semantics, which in turn validates vacuism, Wierenga’s case would
beg the question against nonvacuism. Surely, no-one would be convinced by
an argument for vacuism that depends upon the orthodox semantics for coun-
terfactuals. If either vacuism or nonvacuism is to be established, it should be
defended on independent grounds. Ultimately, Wierenga claims that examples
such as (8) are unconvincing to support nonvacuism given that there is, after
all, an argument available for vacuism.
In this paper I show that Zagzebski’s argument for vacuism, as well as
Wierenga’s beefed-up version of it, is cogent only under the assumption that
the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals — or something very much like it
— is correct. Thus, the argument does depend on orthodoxy. There are recent
semantic approaches for counterfactuals inheriting much of the flavour of the
least Fine (1994). But there is no need to make substantial assumptions concerning essence
for the purposes of this paper, for one could just as well formulate the ideas above by using
only the notion of necessity.
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orthodox semantics but are such that, if assumed, a fundamental premise in
the argument for vacuism is false. In these semantics, involving impossible
worlds, some counterpossibles are false, thereby vindicating nonvacuism. Se-
mantics of this kind for counterfactual conditionals have been developed and
defended by a variety of philosophers including Routley (1989), Read (1995),
Nolan (1997), Mares and Fuhrmann (1995), Mares (1997), Vander Laan (2004),
Kment (2006a,b), Brogaard and Salerno (2013), and, more recently, Berto et
al. (2017). Wierenga’s case for vacuism is therefore unconvincing since the
choice between vacuism and nonvacuism would hinge, ultimately, on which
semantics for counterfactuals we adopt in order to properly evaluate the co-
gency of Zagzebski’s argument. In §2 Zagzebski’s argument for vacuism and
Wierenga’s defense thereof are presented and discussed. In §3 I present in more
detail the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals as a prime example of the
orthodox camp, and I prove Zagzebski’s argument to be sound relative to that
semantics. Wierenga’s argument in favour of the latter is also demonstrated
to be sound. Also, I use Nolan’s (1997) semantics for counterfactuals as an
example of a heterodox option according to which both Zagzebski’s argument
and Wierenga’s defense thereof fail to be sound. Finally, §4 accesses the merits
of a distinction made by Wierenga in order to accommodate the intuition that
some true counterpossibles are not trivial.
2 An argument for vacuism?
In this section I present Zagzebski’s argument for vacuism as formulated by
Wierenga (1999, p. 90), as well as the latter’s reasons to endorse it. The argu-
ment, which I call VAC, goes as follows. Where p and q are any propositions
whatsoever,
(9) If p is impossible, then p entails q. [Premise]
(10) If p entails q, then p counterfactually implies q. [Premise]
(11) If p is impossible, then p counterfactually implies q. [From 9 and 10]
Simply put, if (9) and (10) hold, vacuism is true. The success of the argument
therefore depends on the truth of premises (9) and (10). The former is assumed
by any classical semantics, and we do not need to dispute it here. It should be
pointed out, though, that the notion of entailment underlying (9) is the usual
modal one, that is:
(12) p entails q if and only if it is impossible for p to be true and q false. (Cf.
Wierenga (1999, p. 90)).
4
Wierenga on Theism and Counterpossibles
The truth of (12) will also not be disputed. It remains for us to question the
veracity of (10). As Wierenga (1999, p. 91) points out, Zagzebski’s denial of
(10) looks as though it is grounded in her original examples, which involve
sentences such as (8), of seemingly false counterpossibles.4 The point seems
to be that since “God does not exist” is impossible, it entails “matter would
still exist,” since it is impossible for the former to be true and the latter false.
Yet, the intuition is that the former does not counterfactually imply the latter,
since (8) seems false, hence (10) ought to be rejected.
At any rate, my focus is not on Zagzebski’s rejection of VAC, but Wierenga’s
reasons to endorse it. That is, the question we face is whether there is any
reason at all to endorse (10) that provides us with evidence for vacuism which
is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals. Wierenga thinks
there is. As I see it, he offers two arguments in support of (10) and, conse-
quently, in favour of vacuism. The first comes directly from (12), the modal
notion of entailment. Wierenga says that as soon as we stipulate (12) as a
proper sense of ‘entailment’, alongside (9) “[(10)] likewise seems true. If there
is no way p can be true without q being true, as well, then if p were true, q
would have to be true, too.” (1999, pp. 90-1). Now, admittedly, this is not
so much of an argument, but rather a mere restatement of (10). Wierenga
appears to think that it follows from the concept of entailment as understood
in (12) that if there is a relation of entailment between two propositions there
must also be a relation of counterfactual implication between them. If we
symbolize5 the latter by >, the thesis is that for any propositions p and q,
(13) If p  q, then p > q.
Again, this is just a formal restatement of (10). So why should we believe in
(13)? If the reason is merely that (13) seems to be true, Wierenga’s defense of
VAC so far rests only on intuition, which is no better than Zagzebski’s reasons
for rejecting the same argument. However, another reason might be offered by
defending the truth of conditional proof, which states that in order to prove or
show an implication between two propositions to be true, it is sufficient that
the consequent is true under the assumption that the antecedent is true, too.
In other words, if a proposition entails another, then the former implies the
latter. We all know that under classical assumptions conditional proof holds for
material implication. It is less obvious though that it holds for counterfactual
implication, too. In the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, where vacuism
is true, conditional proof does hold for counterfactual implication. But in some
4Zagzebski (1990, p. 169).
5I purposefully confuse use and mention with respect to logical symbols for readability.
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heterodox semantics for counterfactuals where vacuism is false, conditional
proof fails.6 Thus, whether VAC is sound or not depends on an antecedent
commitment to a semantics for counterfactual implication, for it is against our
choice of a formal semantics or proof theory that we evaluate the truth value
of (13) and, consequently, (10). Otherwise, the only defense of (13) is entirely
intuitive, which, as we have already seen, makes it no more likely to be true
than its denial. In §3 we prove that (13) is true with respect to the orthodox
semantics, but that it fails when a different semantics for counterfactuals is in
play.
Another reason for Wierenga’s endorsement of (13) that bears directly on
(12) is that he might be excluding impossible worlds as ‘ways a world could
be.’ Wierenga would not be alone in this, as Lewis (1986), for instance, also
rejected impossible worlds — although for reasons that were grounded in his
controversial modal realism. In the quote above, Wierenga explicitly talks in
terms of ways a proposition could be true or false. If one restricts ‘ways’ to
possible worlds, then it seems that if there is no possible world w at which p is
true without q being true, it follows that in the closest world u to the actual
one, if p is true at u, q is true at u, too. But this follows only if the closest
world to the actual one in relevant respects is a possible world, rather than an
impossible one. By countenancing impossible worlds, the implication above
does not generally hold.
Two things can be said to elaborate on this. The first is that the hetero-
dox semantics for counterfactuals we present in §3 takes (12) as its notion of
logical consequence. Still, (13) ends up false. Second, why think that im-
possible worlds could not be closer to the actual one than possible worlds?
Suppose God was not omnipotent — which is impossible according to tradi-
tional theism — but could still do everything God actually does. That is,
in this possibility there is nothing which is required of God’s power that was
not actually required, even though some things could have been required that
God would not be able to do but are such that God is able to do. Thus, such
world differs from the actual one purely in its modal profile: rather than being
able to do anything that an omnipotent being could do, God does anything
an omnipotent being in fact does. All of God’s actions, however, remain the
same.7 Although the world just described is an impossible one, there would
6A caveat: I have in mind here single premise conditional proof, for conditional proof
with multiple premises fails even in the usual Lewis/Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals.
See, for instance, Nolan (2016, p. 2637).
7It might be objected that the possibility introduced here violates the Lewisian doctrine
of Humean supervenience, namely, that if two worlds are identical in the matters of particular
fact that they support, they are also identical in their modal and counterfactual properties
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be no noticeable difference from the actual world, and I take that such world
is closer to the actual world than many possible worlds. If this is right, there
seems to be nothing objectionable in admitting impossible worlds in our theory
of counterfactuals.
Now, with respect to VAC, Wierenga concludes the following:
I must admit that my own endorsement of [(11)] had been some-
what ambivalent, at last prior to discovering Zagzebski’s argument
for it. But that argument seems pretty good. I speculate that
at least some of the theistic critics of [(11)] harbor a suspicion
that acceptance of [(11)] is driven by an antecedent commitment
to the usual possible worlds semantics for counterfactual condi-
tionals. Zagzebski’s argument, it seems to me, puts to rest that
suspicion, inasmuch as it offers independent support for [(11)].8 (p.
91)
As we have argued, Wierenga’s original suspicion is true, as VAC does depend
on an antecedent commitment to a certain type of semantics for counterfac-
tuals, as we prove in §3, unless it rests entirely on intuition. Hence, it is false
that premises (9) and (10) offer independent support for (11).
But Wierenga has another argument in favour of vacuism, or, more exactly,
in favour of (10), which he thinks is also independent of orthodoxy. He endorses
a principle formulated by Pollock (1984, p. 113) called generalized consequence
principle, or (GCP), which states the following:
(GCP) If X is a set of states of affairs each member of which would obtain if P
obtained, and X entails Q, then (P > Q) obtains.
Pollock — and, I take it, Wierenga, too — thinks that (GCP) is intuitively
obvious,9 and that it delivers a reason for endorsing (10) that is independent of
the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals. Equipped with (GCP), the argu-
ment put forward by Wierenga is as follows.10 Let p and q be any propositions.
Then
(see Lewis (1986), p. 111). If one countenances Humean supervenience, then one needs to
modify the example accordingly. This can be done simply by assuming some contingent
feature of the world to vary in the case God is not omnipotent. Other examples similar to
these are mentioned in Nolan (1997), especially p. 544.
8I use brackets around the numbers mentioned by Wierenga since these are different from
the ones I ended up having here.
9Pollock (1984, p. 113).
10The argument we consider here is the simplified version of that of Wierenga (1999, top
of p. 92), but there is no significant difference, and the same point could be made with
respect to the other, more complicated argument.
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(14) p counterfactually implies p. [Premise]
(15) If p counterfactually implies p and p entails q, then p counterfactually
implies q. [Premise, from (GCP)]
(10) then follows from (14) and (15). Wierenga seems to take (14) as an
obvious fact about counterfactuals since he does not question it, whereas (15)
is just an instance of (GCP) — which, again, is taken to be intuitively obvious.
He then claims the following:
Now [(10)] was, as far as I can tell, the only premise in Zagzebski’s
argument for [(11)] that could plausibly be questioned. But we
have just seen what I take to be a convincing argument in support
of it. So it looks as though, her intentions to the contrary notwith-
standing, Zagzebski’s argument for [(11)] is successful. (Wierenga,
(1999, p. 92))
Wierenga concludes by saying that given the argument above he finds it “hard
to be persuaded by (...) examples to deny [(11)]” (p. 100), and that, con-
sequently, the theistic examples, rather than (11), should be deemed uncon-
vincing. But even though we do not question the truth of (14), it is far from
obvious that we should accept (15). As we shall see in §3, (15) is true when
evaluated against the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, but it fails once
a different semantics with impossible worlds is assumed. This means that,
once more, the truth of the premises is not independent from an antecedent
commitment to the orthodox semantics. As it is, VAC is still unconvincing for
anyone with intuitions leaning to nonvacuism.
To sum up, Zagzebski presents an argument for vacuism, namely, VAC,
which she ultimately rejects given the force of examples such as (7) and (8)
viz-à-viz premise (10). By contrast, Wierenga endorses VAC, mainly because of
independent arguments for premise (10), which are deemed sufficiently strong
for him to reject the examples. Yet, as we have claimed, and will prove next,
Wierenga’s arguments only have force if we assume the orthodox semantics for
counterfactuals, which entails vacuism. Since there are other semantics that,
if assumed, will make false some of the premises in Wierenga’s arguments,
there is no reason — at least no reason presented by Wierenga — to endorse
VAC that is independent from a previous commitment to orthodoxy. The only
option to get around this, it seems to me, is to endorse those premises on the
basis of intuition, as conceptual truths about counterfactuals. But then those
arguments seem hardly more effective than Zagzebski’s intuitions behind her
original examples.11
11Another option is to offer arguments for vacuism that are truly independent of the
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3 Semantics for counterfactuals
3.1 The orthodox semantics
There are important and well known differences between the semantics offered
by Kratzer, Lewis, and Stalnaker, but these are not relevant for the issues
discussed here, and so we choose to focus on the Lewisian semantics for coun-
terfactuals. Especially because this is the formal semantics receiving much of
the attention in the literature.
We assume a suitable propositional language containing a countably infinite
set of proposition symbols p, q, r,...,¬ for negation, ∧ for conjunction, ⊃ for
the material conditional, and > for the counterfactual conditional. Modal
operators could be added, but we have no need for them here. Now models
for this language can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Lewis Models) A Lewis model is a triple,M = 〈W, $, v〉, such
that
• W is a set of possible worlds,
• $ is a function from worlds to systems of spheres of worlds, where a
system of spheres is a set of sets of worlds, where $w is set of spheres
associated (or around) with w, and
• v is a function from worlds and proposition symbols to truth values.
In accordance with Lewis (1973, p. 14), we impose the following (standard)
conditions on systems of spheres, more of which will be added below:
(C) $w is centered on w, which means that {w} ⊆ $w.
(1) $w is nested, which means that for every S, S ′ ∈ $w, either S ⊆ S ′ or
S ′ ⊆ S.
(2) $w is closed under unions, which means that
⋃
S ∈ $w, provided S ⊆ $w.
(3) $w is closed under (nonempty) intersections, which means that for any
nonempty S ∈ $w, we have
⋂
S ∈ $w.
A formula ϕ is true at a possible world w ∈ W in a model if and only if
vw(ϕ) = {1}. This notion of truth-at-a-world is extended to all formulas as
follows.
orthodox semantics. This is, in part, done by Williamson (2017). But since this paper
focuses on Wierenga’s arguments, a treatment of Williamson’s arguments should be done
elsewhere.
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Definition 3.2 (Truth-at-a-world) For any w ∈ W ,
M, w  p ⇐⇒ vw(p) = {1},
vw(¬ϕ) = {1} ⇐⇒ vw(ϕ) = {0},
vw(ϕ ∧ ψ) = {1} ⇐⇒ vw(ϕ) = {1} and vw(ψ) = {1},
vw(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = {1} ⇐⇒ either vw(ϕ) = {0} or vw(ψ) = {1},
vw(ϕ > ψ) = {1} ⇐⇒ ∀u, S s.t. u ∈ S ∈ $w, vu(ϕ) = {0} or,
∃u, S s.t. u ∈ S ∈ $w, vu(ϕ) = {1} and
∀z ∈ S, vz(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = {1}.
Note the truth conditions for counterfactuals. Informally, we get conditions
(i) and (ii) mentioned in §1, except that the notion of closeness or similarity
is formally encapsulated by Lewis’s systems of spheres. It remains for us to
define truth in a model and logical consequence:
Definition 3.3 (Truth and consequence) A sentence ϕ is true in a Lewis model
M = 〈W, $, v〉, writtenM  ϕ, if and only if vw(ϕ) = {1} for every w ∈ W ,
and a sentence ϕ is a logical consequence of a set of sentences Γ if and only
if for every Lewis modelM = 〈W, $, v〉 and w ∈ W , if vw(γ) = {1} for every
γ ∈ Γ, then vw(ϕ) = {1}.
Now, there are several other conditions on systems of spheres mentioned
by Lewis (1973, p. 120), but we can add at least three of the less controversial
ones, which are also accepted by Nolan (1997, p. 564), for example.
(N) $w is normal, which means that for every w ∈ W ,
⋃
$w is nonempty.
(T) $w is totally reflexive, which means that for every w ∈ W , w ∈
⋃
$w.
(W) $w is weakly centered, which means that for every w ∈ W and nonempty
S ∈ $w, w ∈ S, and ∃S ′ s.t. S ′ ∈ $w and S ′ is nonempty.
Next we show that VAC as well as Wierenga’s second argument are both
sound with respect to the semantics just presented. First we prove (9) and
(10), appropriately formalized.
Proposition 3.1 For any formulas ϕ and ψ, if there is no Lewis modelM =
〈W, $, v〉 and w ∈ W such that vw(ϕ) = {1}, then ϕ  ψ.
Proof. Obvious, since we are assuming a classical semantics.
Proposition 3.2 For any formulas ϕ and ψ, and Lewis modelM = 〈W, $, v〉,
if ϕ  ψ, thenM  ϕ > ψ.
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Proof. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas and suppose that ϕ  ψ. Then for every
Lewis model M = 〈W, $, v〉 and w ∈ W , if vw(ϕ) = {1}, then vw(ψ) = {1}.
Assume, for reductio, that M 2 ϕ > ψ. Then there is a Lewis model M =
〈W, $, v〉 and w ∈ W such that vw(ϕ > ψ) = {0}. By the truth conditions for
>, this means that ∃u, S s.t. u ∈ S ∈ $w, vu(ϕ) = {1} but vu(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = {0},
that is, vu(ψ) = {0}. However, by the first assumption we have vu(ψ) = {1},
which is impossible. Therefore,M  ϕ > ψ.
Theorem 3.1 For any formulas ϕ and ψ, if there is no Lewis model M =
〈W, $, v〉 and w ∈ W such that vw(ϕ) = {1}, then for any Lewis model M =
〈W, $, v〉,M  ϕ > ψ.
Proof. From Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Therefore, VAC is sound with respect to the orthodox semantics. Now it
remains for us to check the truth of (14) and (15), which is simple given the
availability of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.3 For any formula ϕ and Lewis model M = 〈W, $, v〉, M 
ϕ > ϕ.
Proof. SupposeM 2 ϕ > ϕ. Then, simply put, there must be a world w ∈ W
such that vw(ϕ) = {1} but vw(ϕ) = {0}, which is impossible.
Proposition 3.4 For any formulas ϕ and ψ, ifM  ϕ > ϕ and ϕ  ψ, then
M  ϕ > ψ.
Proof. From Propositions 3.1 and 3.3.
Since (10) follows from (14) and (15), Wierenga’s second argument is sound
with respect to the orthodox semantics.
3.2 Nolan’s semantics
The semantics for counterfactuals developed by Nolan generalizes that of Lewis
by adding impossible worlds to the models. His motivation is varied, but it
includes the intuition that some counterpossibles are false (cf. Nolan (1997, p.
544)). The truth conditions for the Boolean connectives remain the same, and
only the counterfactual conditional needs to be modified. Accordingly, Nolan
models can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.4 (Nolan Models) A Nolan model is a tuple, M = 〈W, I, $, v〉,
such that
11
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• W is a set of possible worlds,
• I is a set of impossible worlds,
• $ is a function from worlds (both possible and impossible) to systems
of spheres of worlds (both possible and impossible), where a system of
spheres is a set of sets of worlds (both possible and impossible), and
• v is a function from worlds (possible or impossible) and propositions to
truth values.12
Following Nolan, we write vw(p) = x for x ⊆ {1, 0}, with {1} being true,
{0} false, {1, 0} both, and ∅ neither. Thus, there are four types of values
a sentence could receive in this semantics. This accounts for the fact that
at impossible worlds there can be gaps and/or gluts, that is, sentences that
are neither true nor false, and sentences that are both true and false. In a
nutshell: anything goes in impossible worlds. By contrast, possible worlds
only admit propositions that are either true or false, that is, with values {1}
or {0}. Then, a formula ϕ is true at a possible world w ∈ W in a Nolan
modelM = 〈W, I, $, v〉 if and only if vw(p) = {1}. This notion of truth-at-a-
(possible)world is extended to all formulas just like in the orthodox semantics,
the only difference being the treatment for the counterfactual conditional.
Notice that, originally, Nolan’s semantic conditions for > were just the ones
already defined by Lewis, but the revision below was called for since otherwise
identity for counterfactuals, i.e. ϕ > ϕ, would fail as a theorem (see Nolan
(1997), p. 565). Accordingly, the truth conditions for > are defined as follows:
Definition 3.5 (Truth conditions for counterfactuals)
vw(ϕ > ψ) = {1} ⇐⇒ ∀u, S s.t. u ∈ S ∈ $w, vu(ϕ) = {0} or,
∃u, S s.t. u ∈ S ∈ $w, vu(ϕ) = {1} and
∀z ∈ S, if vz(ϕ) = {1} then vz(ψ) = {1}.
It is important to emphasize that logical consequence and validity in this
semantics is also defined solely with respect to possible worlds (cf. Nolan, p.
563), and hence in perfect consonance with (12). Now it is a simple matter to
show (10) to be false with respect to Nolan’s semantics. (Since we are assuming
a classical semantics, (9) still holds.) We can construct a Nolan modelM =
〈{w}, {i}, $, v〉 where the smallest sphere associated with w includes both w,
which is a possible world, and i, which is an impossible world, and is such
12Nolan (1997) also adds a set pi of propositions, with a short discussion offered on p. 563.
This may be added to the models, but we do not need it for the purposes of this paper.
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that vw(q) = {1}, vi(p) = {1}, and vi(q) = {0}. Since entailment only ranges
over possible worlds, and q is true at the possible world w, p  q holds in this
model, but p > q fails, since the closest world to w where p is true, namely,
i, is also a world where q is false. Thus, according to Nolan’s semantics for
counterfactuals, (10) is false, whence VAC — and Wierenga’s argument — is
unsound relative to it.13 Notice, moreover, that the same model falsifies (15),
for M  p > p holds in this model; after all, the closest world to w where p
holds is a world where p holds.
4 Two senses of triviality
If counterpossibles were vacuously true they would have been trivial, in a
certain sense, since anything would be counterfactually implied by an impos-
sibility. The evidence to the contrary is, nevertheless, widespread. Several
examples like the ones mentioned here and in the literature of seemingly false
counterpossibles are compelling evidence for a nonvacuist treatment. The mer-
its of semantic theories are usually accessed against our semantic intuitions,
which in turn reflect our semantic competence with respect to this or that
linguistic context.14 There is a strong case, therefore, for the acceptance of
nonvacuism. After all, even vacuists would use counterpossibles of the sort “if
some counterpossibles were false, vacuism would still be true” to the effect of
uttering a false proposition.
But philosophical theorizing makes heavy use of counterpossibles. If all
of them are trivial, then it seems that a large portion of philosophical theo-
rizing involving counterfactual thinking with impossible antecedents would be
trivial and, hence, in a certain sense, uninformative. This point has been elab-
orated by many including Freddoso (1986, p. 45), Zagzebski (1990, p. 171),
Nolan (1997, pp. 536–41), and Brogaard and Salerno (2013, pp. 644–45). In
response, Wierenga distinguishes two ways in which a counterfactual can be
said to be trivial/nontrivial: (a) a counterfactual is trivial if its antecedent is
impossible — that is, if it is a counterpossible, (b) a counterfactual is non-
trivial if it is “derivable from a nontrivial general truth or if it is justified by
some such nontrivial truth.” (1999, p. 97) Wierenga offers no argument for
this distinction, but we can imagine that his motivation involves the claim
13Nolan (2016) explores the failure of conditional proof in another context, as a way of
blocking Curry’s paradox.
14As Dowty et al. (1981, p. 2) puts, native speakers’ “judgments of synonymy, entailment,
contradiction, and so on” provide the grounds according to which we evaluate semantic
theories.
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that if a proposition follows at all from a nontrivial general truth, then the
former proposition inherits, as it were, the latter’s nontriviality. He then gives
examples of such a principle in play, one of which goes as follows. Suppose we
want to prove that the square root of two is an irrational number. We may
prove this by reductio:
(16) The square root of two is a rational number. [Premise for reductio]
(17) For every real number r, if r is a rational number there are integers n
and m such that at most one of n and m is even and r is equal to n
divided by m. [Theorem]
(18) If the square root of two were a rational number there would be integers
n and m such that at most one of n and m is even and the square root
of two is equal to n divided by m. [From 16 and 17]
(19) There are integers n and m such that at most one of n and m is even
and the square root of two is equal to n divided by m. [From 16 and 18]
Since (19) is absurd, we can discharge the assumption (16) and conclude that
the square root of two is irrational. But, as Wierenga claims, even though
(18) is a counterpossible, and trivial according to vacuism, it is nontrivial in
the sense of (b), since it follows from the general and nontrivial mathematical
truth (17).
However, for every true counterpossible we can easily devise a nontrivial
general truth from which it is derivable. And we can show this by assuming
some of the very premises used in VAC, that is, by assuming the whole vacuist
framework granted by Wierenga. Let p and q be any propositions, except that
p is impossible. Then
(20) Necessarily, If p is impossible, p counterfactually implies q. [From 11]
(21) Necessarily, p counterfactually implies q. [From 20 and assumption that
p is impossible]
(22) Necessarily, ¬p is true. [From assumption, since the negation of an
impossibility is necessarily true]
(23) It is impossible that ¬p is true and that p does not counterfactually
imply q. [From 21 and 22]
(24) ¬p entails that p counterfactually implies q. [From 23 and 12]
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Another way of making the same point is by just observing that if p > q is
a true counterpossible, both it and ¬p are necessarily true, and therefore the
latter entails the former. Now, one might immediately object that sentences
such as ¬p are not general truths, which is what Wierenga’s condition (b) re-
quires. In a sense, however, necessary truths are general, since they are usually
understood as embedding a quantifier over worlds, circumstances, situations,
and so forth; for instance: at every possible world ¬p is true, under all cir-
cumstances ¬p is true. But, in any case, it is simple to transform a truth into
a general truth. Take the following list of counterpossibles:
(25) If God were evil, traditional theism as it actually is would not offer a
correct depiction of God.
(26) If water were XYZ, its chemical compound would differ from the actual
one.
(27) If Intuitionistic logic were the one true logic, the law of excluded middle
would be true.
We can derive these, respectively, from the following general principles:
(29) Necessarily, for every x, x is God only if x is not evil.
(30) Necessarily, for every x, x is water if and only if x is H20.
(31) Necessarily, for every x, x is Intuitionistic logic only if x is not the one
true logic.
Moreover, it seems we could also just devise a general nontrivial truth from
which a true counterpossible is derivable. For example, the counterpossible
if Hobbes had (secretly) squared the circle, the sick children in the mountains
of South America at the time would not have cared seems true.15 But this is
derivable from if anyone had (secretly) squared the circle in Europe, the sick
children in the mountains of South America at the time would not have cared,
which is general and nontrivially true — it is, in fact, empirical. It seems that
for any counterpossible one could always generate such general truths, whence
condition (b) is easily met. In this sense, (b) is too weak. But, for what it is
worth, we can also show that (b) is too strong, for there are straightforward
counterexamples to (b). Take Wierenga’s own example involving the square
root of two. The counterpossible if the square root of two were rational, the
square root of two would be rational is trivial, uninformative, and necessarily
true. Therefore, it is entailed by any proposition. A fortiori, it is entailed by
Wierenga’s own (18).
15This examples comes from Nolan (1997, p. 544).
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5 Conclusion
I have discussed arguments endorsed by Wierenga to support vacuism about
counterpossibles and found them wanting. In particular, Wierenga’s main
defense of vacuism was shown to depend on the orthodox semantics for coun-
terfactuals and, therefore, notwithstanding his intentions, not independent
thereof. Despite the results concerning VAC andWierenga’s defense of vacuism,
there is still a question about the claim that theism illuminates philosophical
logic by showing, somehow, the need of admitting false counterpossibles. With
respect to this, I must say that there seems to be nothing special regarding
the relation between theism and counterpossibles. For, if theism ought to be
committed to nonvacuism given intuitive judgments about sentences like (7)
and (8), then we would have to say that mathematics, chemistry, logic, bi-
ology, and myriads of other disciplines are also committed to nonvacuism for
the same reason, namely, intuitive judgments regarding counterpossibles. By
characterizing the antecedent of a certain counterpossible deemed false as im-
possible relative to a certain theory T, which might be theism, mathematics,
chemistry, or whatever, analogous reasoning would make us say that all of
these are committed to nonvacuism. And since examples like the ones men-
tioned here might be multiplied without limit, there is nothing about theism
per se and its relation to counterpossibles that we should take to be surprising
or illuminating. Rather, the examples relevant to theism are just instances of
a much more general point that some counterpossibles which are contraries,
that is, of the form ϕ > ψ and ϕ > ¬ψ, cannot both be true. This is not to say
that theists should not believe in nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Rather,
theists should not believe theism is special in illuminating this particular area
of philosophical logic.
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